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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to undertake an assessment of airport competition within the Scottish 
Lowlands region, which has experienced significant variations in economic development, and 
to examine whether competitive forces have been strengthening or weakening in recent years. 
This region covers the airports of Edinburgh, Glasgow and Prestwick in the last twelve years 
they have all experienced changes in ownership. BAA which had, for many years, operated 
both Edinburgh and Glasgow airports, sold the former to GIP in 2012 whilst in 2013 the 
Scottish Government purchased the privately-owned Prestwick.  During this period there were 
also significant changes in airline network strategies. In order to assess the competitive 
pressures facing these airports, three key areas are considered, namely: aeronautical charging 
policy, the service quality provided and traffic development. The analysis shows that since 
ownership separation, competition has intensified between Edinburgh and Glasgow, whilst 
Prestwick airport, which benefitted from Ryanair expansion in the 1990s, is now a significantly 
diminished competitive proposition in the Scottish Lowland market. This has implications not 
only for airport policy and economic regulation but also for broader economic well-being in 
this region.  
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1. Introduction 
The Scottish Lowlands region in the UK with a total population of around five million citizens 
is served by three main airports: Edinburgh, Glasgow and Prestwick. Edinburgh is the largest 
of the three, serving 14.3 million passengers in 2018, compared to 9.7 million at Glasgow and 
only 0.7 million at Prestwick.  Edinburgh and Glasgow airports are separated by a distance of 
77 km, connected by the M8 motorway which links their respective metropolitan areas, with 
populations of around 450,000 and 600,000 respectively.  Prestwick also serves the Glasgow 
metropolitan region.  However, Glasgow airport is much closer to the main population 
catchment area as it is located in Paisley which is only 15 km from the City Centre.  In contrast, 
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despite having a direct rail connection to Glasgow city centre, Prestwick is disadvantaged by 
its location, sited approximately 64km to the south of its nearest competitor (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Map of Lowland Scotland 
Source: adapted from ArcGIS 
Historically Prestwick served as the principal international gateway for the region, as traffic 
distribution rules and air service bilateral agreements ensured that it had exclusive rights as 
the only airport able to host transatlantic scheduled flights from Scotland.  When these 
restrictions were removed in 1990, transatlantic airlines switched their operations to Glasgow 
ensuring that it emerged and remained the preferred Scottish gateway for international 
services during the 1990s. The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh in 1999 
and the growth of its financial services sector provided the extra stimulus behind a sustained 
and robust period of traffic growth post-2000 to such an extent that by 2007, it eclipsed 
Glasgow to become the busiest airport in Scotland.  
Since 2007, there have been a number of important developments affecting the three airports. 
In 2008 the financial crisis and global economic recession had a significant impact on airport 
traffic levels across the world.  During this period in the UK and more specifically in Scotland 
there were also significant developments in airport ownership. Both airports were 
incorporated into the state-owned British Airports Authority (BAA) during the 1970s.  Joint 
ownership continued when the BAA was privatised in 1987.  However, in 2009, the former UK 
competition authority (the Competition Commission) following an investigation, had 
concluded that such common ownership had given rise to adverse effects on competition and 
subsequently BAA was forced to sell Edinburgh in 2012.  This was followed by BAA’s successor 
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entity, Heathrow Airports Holding’s (HAH), disposal of Glasgow in 2014. The ownership of 
Prestwick evolved differently.  Whilst originally part of the BAA group when it was privatised 
in 1987, it was subsequently acquired by a number of different private owners. However, a 
recent decline in traffic and financial problems led to the airport being re-nationalised by the 
Scottish Government in 2013.  
During this period of ownership change, other significant developments had been occurring 
within the European air transport environment. Airline and airport competition intensified, 
especially with the emergence of the low cost carrier (LCC) sector. In more recent years, the 
strategies of these LCCs, and the competing full service carriers (FSCs) and charter airlines 
have further evolved, having a major impact on the airports, including the Scottish ones, that 
they serve.  
In light of changes in airport ownership and in the evolution of airline competitive strategies, 
there is a case for trying to understand how these developments have impacted on the nature 
of airport competition within the Scottish Lowlands region as this has implications for future 
airport ownership, economic regulation and other policies. Moreover, whilst quantifying the 
connection between airport growth and broader economic development remains problematic, 
it is widely acknowledged that this can be a positive relationship. Within this context, the 
Scottish Lowlands area is particularly interesting as it has experienced significant upturns and 
downturns in economic prosperity in recent years, particularly with Edinburgh’s situation 
improving after the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1998, and Glasgow’s relative 
decline due to contraction of surrounding heavy industries and manufacturing activities.   
The nature of airport competition needs to be investigated not only through gauging the actual 
degree of airport competition but also in determining whether there has been a strengthening 
or weakening of competitive forces through time. In order to undertake this research, three 
key performance areas have been considered: the level/structure of airport charges, service 
quality and the development of traffic and routes from 2006 to the present day.    
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section provides the background context by 
presenting a literature review related to airport competition and the UK airport industry. This 
is followed by an identification of the performance metrics used and the data sources. The 
analysis is presented in Section 4 and Section 5 provides a general discussion that reflects on 
the analysis. Section 6 draws concluding comments.  
2. Background literature review covering airport competition and UK 
airports   
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2.1 Airport competition 
Airport competition has become an area of increasing interest within the research literature 
with many relevant and diverse issues being explored. Indeed, Forsyth at al. (2010) produced 
the first publication devoted to airport competition consisting of 26 chapters covering areas 
such as competition strength, traveller choice and policy decisions. Elsewhere, Barrett (2000) 
investigated competition between primary and secondary airports and LCCs, Graham (2006) 
considered competition within airports (e.g. with services and terminals) versus between 
airports, and Socorro et al. (2018) focused on airport and airline market power and the impact 
of carrier nationality. 
Overall, the key driving forces of airport competition are increased liberalisation and 
deregulation which has presented airlines with much more freedom to operate from airports 
of their choice.  This has provided airports with an opportunity to compete for traffic. The 
more liberal environment has also led to the emergence of new airline business models, most 
notably LCCs, which have proved to be challenging and somewhat footloose airline customers 
for airports as they seek to attract and maintain air services (Bush and Starkie; 2014; Gillen 
and Lall, 2004; Graham, 2013; Humphreys et al., 2006). 
The competitive opportunities afforded by deregulation have had a transformative effect on 
airport business models.  Many airports have matured into commercially sophisticated 
organisations developing a wide range of business development competencies most notably in 
marketing, route development and in delivering service quality. Increasing privatisation of 
airports has reinforced the need to pursue such commercially-orientated strategies. Moreover, 
the advance of privatisation, concerns with regard to airport market power and developing 
appropriate frameworks of economic regulation, has stimulated more discussion and debate 
on the extent to which airport markets are truly competitive.   If the extent of competition is 
deemed to be  insufficient, appropriate and alternative methods of economic regulation have 
been discussed and implemented, in order to substitute for competition and protect users 
against the potential abuse of market power (Bel and Fageda, 2013; Forsyth, 2006; Starkie, 
2012). 
There is a lack of agreement in the literature as to the degree to which competitive rivalry exists 
in the airport industry. Reports commissioned by Airports Council International (ACI) 
Europe, in advancing the commercial interests of its membership, favour light-handed 
regulation and they have presented evidence of a relatively high level of competition in airport 
markets (ACI-Europe, 2014; ACI-Europe, 2017; Oxera, 2017; Thelle et al., 2012). Thelle and la 
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Cour (2018) have supported these arguments, calling for competition constraints associated 
with economic regulation to be relaxed.  Meanwhile, certain airlines and the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) have argued vehemently against these opinions (e.g. IATA, 
2013). Wiltshire (2018), in support of the airline position, challenged ACI’s arguments, 
claiming that competition is limited in the airport sector and therefore there is a continuing 
need for robust economic regulation. Lieshout et al. (2016) argued that airport (and airline) 
competition in fact varies within Europe, being strongest in the UK, Benelux, Western 
Germany, Switzerland and Northern Italy. It is often with regional airports where the 
competitive forces can be particularly strong due to the existence of shared catchment areas, 
providing both airlines and passengers with the ability to choose between different local 
airports. This is very relevant for the Scottish airport case here.   
An indication of the airport competitive environment can arguably be detected through the 
aeronautical charging policies established by airports (Bottasso et al., 2017). Indeed 
LeighFisher (2012) identified the extent to which competition is available, as well as the mix 
of airlines and routes served, as key drivers for airport charges and aeronautical revenue 
differentiation. Competitive pressures could well drive down prices and produce declining 
airport yields. There is evidence in both the US (Van Dender, 2007) and in Europe (Bel and 
Fageda, 2010) of lower aeronautical charging when airports face competition from 
neighbouring airports. Moreover, increased competition between airports has led to the 
widespread adoption of incentives offered for new or expanded services and sometimes 
bespoke agreements or contracts between airports and individual airlines (Halpern and 
Graham, 2016), one of the numerous examples being in Poland (Huderek-Glapska and Nowak, 
2016).  Such deviation from standard airport published charges is becoming increasingly 
common in Europe (Fichert, 2019; Jones et al, 2013; Malina et al, 2012). In fact, Jankovic 
declared that 90% of all members of ACI-Europe offered some type of discount, whilst in the 
US, Ryerson (2016) in a study of 70 airports, found that incentives were offered by 63% of 
them.  
Another indication of airport market competitive intensity is through the growing focus on 
service quality improvement as it can be argued that rival airports will deploy additional effort 
and resources in improving facilities and process efficiency in order to attract more airlines 
and passengers (OECD, 2014).  Whilst the literature in this area is relatively scarce, Prentice 
and Kadan (2019) recently found that airport service quality was significantly related to 





Clearly the successful airport competitive strategies will also be reflected in their traffic 
development. Strong growth in traffic can indicate the efefcts of airport rivalry where airlines 
have been incentivised to establish new services or expand existing networks and their 
passengers are encouraged to fly more frequently. New airlines and new routes can provide 
passengers with more airport choice. Moreover route churn which may involve passengers or 
airlines switching between different airports, or airlines exiting routes or abandoning airports 
entirely, can help demonstrate the true substitutability of competing airports. Indeed, in 
relation to route churn, Thelle at al. (2012) found that in 2011 around 2,500 new routes were 
launched in Europe compared 2,000 closures and every year around 20 per cent of the total 
were route openings compared to 15 per cent closures. Route churn, particularly in relation to 
LCCs was also observed to be intensifying in Europe by De Wit (2016).  An analysis of traffic 
shifts within airport catchment areas can additionally help to assess the competitive forces 
that exist (Pantazis and Liefner, 2006; Lieshout, 2012) by giving more insight into passenger 
choice factors. 
Further understanding is also provided by exploring airport competition from the users’ (e.g. 
airlines, passengers) perspective, and in particular by analysing those factors that influence 
their choice of airport. For example, Dziedzi and Warnock-Smith (2016) found that the most 
important factors influencing LCC choice of airport were airport costs, demand and catchment 
area, and efficient operations. These can be linked to the discussion above concerning charges, 
traffic development and service quality. For passengers, airport choice is that much more 
complicated in the sense that it is driven to some extent by the nature of air services that are 
offered (in terms of fares, destinations, schedules etc.) – in effect the airline product – will be 
the key salient factor as it is unlikely passengers will chose an airport unless it offers the 
required travel opportunities. However, factors including: distance, the cost and ease of 
surface access to a certain airport, as well as price and convenience of car parking, can also be 
very important to passengers.  Research consistently shows that the nature of air services and 
airport accessibility are the most salient choice factors (CAA, 2011; Mohammed and Roisman, 
2017).  Some contributions have applied more sophisticated approaches using discrete choice 
models to understand combined choices relating to airlines, airports and surface access (Hess 





2.2 The UK airport market 
The UK airport industry was the first in the world to privatise airports when it passed the 1986 
Airports Act (Humphreys, 1999). In 1987, the then British Airports Authority which owned 
Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, London Gatwick, London Heathrow, London Stansted, 
Prestwick and Southampton was floated on the London stock exchange as a single entity to 
become the fully-privately owned company BAA.  The legislation also required that all local 
municipal-owned regional airports generating over £1 million in annual turnover, were to be 
established and managed as limited liability companies.  This, in essence, was the first step in 
their transition to privatisation. In the following 25 years all the main regional airports became 
either fully or partially privately operated (although two have also returned to public 
ownership).  This, in combination with the overall growth of traffic, particularly due to 
liberalisation and the development of the LCC sector,  means that UK regional airports have 
reached a stage of maturity having become accustomed to operating in a more commercial and 
competitive environment (Starkie, 2008; Ison et al. 2011).   
With regards to BAA, there was considerable debate prior to its sale as to whether the airports 
should have been sold individually or collectively as a group (Littlechild, 2018).  Arguments in 
favour of collective privatisation included the potential advantages that stem from economies 
of scale, financial robustness and resilience achieved through its size, the diversity of its the 
assets and the sharing of technical and managerial expertise across the group.  Arguments 
against collective privatisation tended to focus on the potential loss of benefits that could have 
accrued from airport competition (Graham, 2009; Toms 2004).  In spite of several UK 
Government reviews which re-visited these arguments, BAA’s quasi-monopoly continued 
unchallenged until 2009. Commercial interest and expediency rather than competition policy 
prompted the sale of Prestwick in 1992 to the Canadian entrepreneur Matthew Hudson 
following the loss of transatlantic airline operations to Glasgow.  The airport consequently 
experienced a sharp decline in traffic before a renaissance was engineered by Hudson 
following the establishment and subsequent expansion of a Ryanair base in the mid-1990s. 
Prestwick was sold on to the Scottish transport operator Stagecoach in 1998 and then to 
Infratil, the New Zealand infrastructure investment company, in 2001.   
However, the major turning point for BAA was in 2009 when following another review of its 
market power, the Competition Commission (now known as Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA)) concluded that its common ownership of airports in the South-East of 
England and Scotland was detrimental to competition (Competition Commission, 2009; Bush 
2009).  As a consequence, BAA was ordered to sell Gatwick (sold in 2009), Stansted (sold in 
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2013) and Edinburgh or Glasgow (Edinburgh sold in 2012). In 2016, the CMA, with the help 
of its consultants ICF, undertook a detailed assessment of the effects of the airport divestments 
(CMA 2016; ICF 2016).  The report was able to identify a number of factors that suggested that 
competitive rivalry had intensified since divestment, manifested in changes to the structure of 
aeronautical charges, improvements in service quality (observed at Gatwick and expected at 
Stansted/Edinburgh) and greater passenger growth compared to other airports following the 
adoption of more intensive efforts to attract new airlines.  
Meanwhile, Infratil decided to sell Prestwick Airport in 2012 owing to its deteriorating 
commercial and financial performance largely as a consequence of Ryanair’s decision to 
transfer a significant volume of its operations to Glasgow.  Fearing the potential wider 
economic and employment consequences of closure, it was bought by the Scottish Government 
for a nominal price of £1 in November 2013 (Auditor General, 2015).  HAH (BAA’s successor 
entity) the owner of the rump of airports that had not been divested, took a decision to focus 
on its core asset Heathrow and subsequently sold off its remaining airports including Glasgow 
in 2014.  Ownership of Glasgow, as well as the other HAH Scottish airport Aberdeen was 
transferred to AGS, with 50% being owned by Ferrovial which also had a significant 
shareholding (25%) in HAH (BBC, 2014). 
In parallel to these changes in ownership, there were also important developments in relation 
to traffic growth, the evolution of LCCs operations and shifts in airline and airport strategies, 
and this has been subject of some interesting research (e.g. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), 
2005, 2007; Papatheodorou and Lei, 2006; Halpern et al. 2016; Lei and Pagliari, 2013, 
Halpern and Graham, 2017). It is clear from this evidence base that the operating and 
competitive environment for each individual regional UK airport had varied enormously and 
as a result, their performance and achievements through time had been very different.  
However, there has been very little detailed consideration of the Scottish airports, except the 
contribution by Pagliari (2005) on international route development. Therefore, this paper 
goes some way in addressing the literature gap.  
3. Choice of Performance Metrics  
Buildling on the literature review, an analysis of aeronautical charging, service quality 
performance and traffic development has been chosen to assess the extent and development 
of competition within the Scottish Lowlands region. Key performance metrics for these areas 
(traffic development has been divided into traffic growth, route development and catchment 
area analysis) have been defined in Table 1 and accompanied by the data sources used. The 
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metrics focus very much on the airport’s perspective of competition, and so are very similar to 
those adopted in the studies of ICF (2016) and CMA (2016), rather than looking at broader 
issues related to airline and passenger choice factors that were also mentioned in the literature 
review.   
Table 1: Analysis areas and data sources  
 Analysis areas 2006-2018/(financial values in real terms) Data sources 
1 Aeronautical charging: 
Turnaround airport charges 
Landing charges 
International and domestic passenger charges  
Aeronautical revenue per passenger/aircraft movement 
Published airport 
charges from the 
airport’s websites, 
airport annual reports 
2 Service quality performance: 
ACI ASQ passenger satisfaction scores 
Which? travel passenger satisfaction scores 
 
Airport annual reports, 
ICF (2016), Which? UK  
airport reports (as 
published in the Which? 
Travel Magazine) 
3 Traffic growth: 
Total, domestic, EU and non-EU passenger growth, market share 
CAA airport statistics 
4 Route development: 
Number of routes 
Route churn  
Unserved routes 
OAG schedule data, The 
Route Shop website 
5 Catchment area analysis: 
Top ten regions served by Edinburgh and Glasgow airport 
CAA airport surveys 
For aeronautical charging, initially all charges incurred on an aircraft turnaround are 
considered. This is very much influenced by landing and passenger charges, which account for 
the majority of aeronautical revenues, and so these are also investigated separately. However, 
these measures only show the published airport charges and not the discounts and incentives 
that airports are increasingly offering.  An assessment of actual aeronautical revenue per 
passenger/aircraft movement, as frequently used in airport economic performance literature, 
was used to measure this.   
As regards service quality, it is difficult for researchers to obtain sufficient data and insights 
on service quality at different airports. Data and performance metrics remain largely 
proprietary. The online customer service ratings platform Skytrax is accessible, but the sample 
size of customers submitting their views at the three Scottish airports is small and varies 
considerably. Indeed, it is doubtful whether Skytrax can be considered as a reliable source 
given the greater degree of subjectivity and bias in the data.  Some limited evidence can, 
however, be accessed from the surveys of ACI ASQ and Which?. The ASQ is arguably the most 
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well-known, extensive and dependable source, but only the airports themselves have access to 
most of the data. The Which? data is a useful source that is not often used in academic research 
and so provides additional insight. Which? is a reliable and well-established consumer 
organisation, with a sample size of over 11,000, albeit limited to Which? Subscribers only 
(Which?, 2019a; 2019b). The UK CAA has also started to report overall passenger experience 
ratings from their annual airport surveys but data is only available for the last two years.    
Traffic development data which is more consistent and more easily accessible was used to 
provide both demand and supply dimensions.  Passenger volumes, segmented by key markets, 
reveals the nature of demand, whereas supply is represented by route development metrics.  
These measures have been widely used in similar research, whereas catchment area analysis, 
which links traffic generation to the surrounding geography, is more uncommon as the CAA 
data is a rare example where such data is freely available and based on reliable and extensive 
surveys.   
For most of the analysis, a time horizon 2006-2018 was selected.  This 13-year dataset was 
considered to be long enough to assess the impact of recent developments.  2006 was chosen 
specifically to provide at least two comparatively ‘normal’ years before the onset of the global 
recession. Moreover, since major ownership changes occurred in 2012-2013, the time horizon 
selected provides for a more balanced and comprehensive perspective before and after these 
developments. 
4. Analysis  
4.1 Aeronautical charging 
The first part of the analysis involves a comparison of the aeronautical charges levied at the 
three Scottish airports (Table 2).  Comparative charges levels are assessed by aggregating the 
individual charges that are levied for a given aircraft turnaround operation (arrival and 
departure) based on fixed and common assumptions relating to aircraft type, passenger load 
factor, parking time and the number of bags.  This approach is known as the turnaround cost 
method as it sums all the charges that are incurred in an aircraft turnaround (landing, on 
ground, departure). The A320 aircraft has been chosen with an assumed load factor of 85% 
and parking time on the stand of 60 minutes as this is fairly typical of the aircraft operations 
at these airports. It is also assumed that the aircraft turnaround involves an arrival from and 
departure to an international airport in another EU member state.  
It is evident that Edinburgh is the most expensive airport, followed by Glasgow and then 
Prestwick, providing some evidence of price divergence and competitive rivalry between the 
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three airports.  The passenger charge is by far the most important in revenue terms, followed 
by the landing charge and so both of these are given more detailed consideration.   
 
Table 2: Turnaround airport 1 charges at Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Prestwick 2018-2019 
 Edinburgh Glasgow Prestwick 
Landing charge £429.98 £416.01 £339.57 
Parking charge  £24.99 £17.28 £0.00 
Passenger charge  £2,425.04 £2,053.26 £1,666.17 
Terminal navigation charge £355.01 £342.51 £226.38 
Persons of Reduced Mobility (PRM) charge £82.62 £80.02 - 
Police and aviation security charge £61.20 - £336.60 
Baggage hall and screening charges £113.22 £125.46 £38.25 
TOTAL £3,492.05 £3,034.24 £2,606.97 
1 Based on an A320 (MTOW 73.5), seat capacity 180, load factor 85% (passengers 153), parking time 60 minutes 
and 77 hold bags.  
Source: Edinburgh, Glasgow and Prestwick airports conditions of use documents 2018-2019. 
In Figures 2 and 3 we compare individual landing and passenger charges for Edinburgh and 
Glasgow over the period 2006 to 2019.  
Figure 2: Landing charge per tonne of MTOW at 
Edinburgh and Glasgow airports 2006-
2018 
 




Figure 3 shows that, in contrast to the landing charge, a significant and distinct deviation 
emerged between the two airports with respect to the trajectory of published per passenger 
charges.  
Figure 3: International and domestic per passenger 
charge at Edinburgh and Glasgow airport 
2006-2018 
 
Source: Edinburgh and Glasgow conditions of use documents 2006-
2018 
Under BAA ownership between 2006 and 2012, charges were fairly similar and as with the 
landing charge, there were notable real-term reductions. There was, however, a sharper 
decrease in the international passenger charge at Glasgow in 2009 possibly as a reaction to 
weaker market conditions following the 2008 financial crisis. Since 2012, charges have not 
only increased but they also have also diverged substantially, rising at a much faster rate at 
Edinburgh compared to Glasgow.  This is especially with regard to the domestic charge which 
increased by a factor of 35% in real terms since 2012 at Edinburgh airport.  
As discussed in the literature review, many airlines do not pay the full published rates. Instead, 
they often negotiate a discount as an incentive offered by the airports to attract new or expand 
existing air services. They may go even further by entering into longer-term bespoke 
negotiated agreements with airports that involve a degree of risk-sharing where charges are 
linked to incentives around the airline’s delivery of traffic and capacity. Prestwick has such an 
agreement with Ryanair and indeed on the airport marketing website ‘The Route Shop’, the 
airport states (The Route Shop, 2019):   
‘Glasgow Prestwick offers airlines a ‘one stop shop’ offering with highly competitive deals 
and packages to include: Landing and navigation, Terminal Infrastructure, Security, 
Passenger Handling, Aircraft Handling.  Charges can be structured on a per departing 
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passenger basis (no MTOW charges) which shares the risk by only charging for 
passengers onboard.  Offering the best deal available within the Scottish market’ 
Generally, incentives that offer no landing charge are popular, because of the identified 
reduced risk for the airline (but consequently greater risk for the airport). Edinburgh and 
Glasgow airports also state in their conditions of use documents that they offer incentives, but 
no further details are provided.   
As discussed, average aeronautical revenue per traffic unit, otherwise known as aeronautical 
yield, can take into account these incentives and individual negotiated rates, and so is arguably 
a more accurate measure of actual price than the published tariffs.  This represents the average 
price that is paid by all operations at an airport by dividing the total aeronautical revenue in a 
financial year by the volume of traffic units (passengers or air transport movements). 
However, it is important to recognise that one of the limitations inherent in using yield to 
represent average price, is that movement over time will not only reflect alterations in charging 
policy but equally shifts in traffic mix and possible strategies designed to differentiate between 
routes, airlines and passengers that the airport may wish to attract.  The movement of 
aeronautical yield over time is shown in Figures 4 and 5. with the former based on passenger 
volume as the traffic denominator and the latter based on aircraft movements.  
Regarding passenger-based yield, Prestwick was excluded because of the very different mix of 
traffic handled by the airport.  The airport has historically served the non-regular passenger 
market, a segment that has become especially more prominent since 2008 because of the 
significant decline in passenger-related activity. It would therefore be misleading to compare 
passenger-based yield with Glasgow and Edinburgh because at those airports, traffic mix has 
historically remained quite stable with a substantial proportion accounted for by regular 
scheduled and charter services.   
According to Figure 4, passenger yield has followed a broadly similar trajectory to that of the 
published rates, in that the overall level of charges is higher at Edinburgh, especially after 
2012. By contrast, whilst published prices declined in real terms between 2008 and 2010, 
aeronautical yield increased at both airports.  
However, this period coincided with reductions in passenger numbers at both airports, which 
may partly explain higher aeronautical yield as the dominant passenger charge is directly 
linked to passenger numbers. Subsequently yields at Edinburgh rose marginally (very broadly 
moving in a similar direction as published charges) whereas Glasgow’s yield declined 
significantly suggesting a much more extensive use of discounts.  Indeed, what is striking is 
14 
 
that the gap between both airports in terms of average passenger yield has widened 
considerably since ownership separation in 2012. 
Figure 4: Aeronautical revenues per passenger in 
real terms at Edinburgh and Glasgow 









Source: Annual reports and accounts for Edinburgh International Airport Ltd and Glasgow 
International Airport Ltd 
Figure 5: Aeronautical revenues per aircraft 
movement at Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Prestwick airport in real terms 2006-2017  
 
Source: Annual reports and accounts for Edinburgh International Airport Ltd, 
Glasgow International Airport Ltd and Prestwick International Airport 2006 
to 2017  
When aircraft movements is used as the yield denominator, Prestwick is included and what is 
observed is the considerable gap that has existed with its competitors since 2006 and has 





4.2 Service quality performance 
It is usually assumed that within competitive markets that there are strong incentives for 
airports to maintain or enhance service quality. In the the ACI ASQ survey, passengers rank 
their level of satisfaction from 1 (very poor) to 5 (excellent). In Table 3, scores out of 5 have 
been converted into percentages (data before 2010 was not available, nor for Prestwick).  
Values at Edinburgh were consistently higher than at Glasgow. Overall at both airports 
satisfaction rates improved over the period, although Edinburgh experienced a dip in 2013 
and 2014. Which? travel also produced scores for the three airports for 2008, 2011 and 2014-
2018 (just the early years for Prestwick). Whereas up to 2015 similar observations can be made 
as with the ACI ASQ results (i.e. scores increasing at Glasgow and Edinburgh, with higher 
scores at Edinburgh), in the period that follows, trajectories are not so clear, with Glasgow 
overtaking Edinburgh as the best ranked airport and with some declines as well as 
improvements in satisfaction scores.  By contrast, satisfaction levels obtained by the CAA for 
2018, which have not be available for previous years, show Glasgow and Edinburgh having 
almost identical scores when converted to percentages of 85% (CAA, 2019) which further 
complicates what appears to be a rather mixed and inconsistent message with regard to service 
quality between airports in the region. For the limited years when scores for Prestwick airport 
are available, satisfaction levels also seem to be improving and in 2011 and 2014 were similar 
to those at Glasgow airport. 
Table 3: Passenger satisfaction measures at Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Prestwick airport 2008-2018  
Year ACI ASQ survey Which? travel survey 
 Edinburgh Glasgow Edinburgh Glasgow Prestwick 
2008 n/a n/a 55 50 46 
2009 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2010 80.0 77.2 n/a n/a n/a 
2011 82.0 78.0 60 54 53 
2012 83.8 79.6 n/a n/a n/a 
2013 82.0 79.2 n/a n/a n/a 
2014 82.1 80.8 63 57 58 
2015 85.6 82.0 63 62 n/a 
2016 85.8 81.8 59 64 n/a 
2017 87.2 82.0 56 59 n/a 
2018 n/a n/a 59 63 n/a 
Source: Annual reports and accounts for Edinburgh International Airport Ltd and Glasgow International 
Airport Ltd 2010 to 2017, ICF (2016), Which? travel UK airport survey 2008 to 2018 
4.3 Traffic growth  
16 
 
Figure 6 shows combined terminal passenger volumes at the three Scottish Lowland airports 
between 2006 and 2018. Overall there has been growth, but the effect of the financial crisis 
and economic recession in 2008-2010 is clearly apparent. In the latest year 2018, overall 
traffic grew although there was a slight decline at Glasgow (the first since 2010) and Prestwick. 
Figure 6: Terminal passengers at Edinburgh, 
Glasgow and Prestwick airport 2006-2018 
 
Source: CAA airport statistics 2006-2018 
Figure 7 illustrates very clearly how Edinburgh has increased its market share (43% to 58%) – 
becoming the busiest airport in 2007 - whilst Prestwick’s share has declined significantly (12% 
to 3%), and now only represents a very marginal proportion of the total market. Glasgow’s 
share has declined slightly from 44% to 39%, seemingly gaining traffic from Prestwick but 
losing to Edinburgh.   
Figure 7: Market share (%) of Edinburgh, Glasgow 









Source: CAA airport statistics 2006-2018 
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Overall volumes of domestic traffic have declined between 2006 and 2018 and at Prestwick 
there are no longer any domestic services (Figure 8).  
Figure 8: Domestic terminal passengers at 
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Prestwick 









Source: CAA airport statistics 2006-2018 
However, this has been offset by much faster growth in international EU traffic, steadily at 
Edinburgh, and after the economic recession at Glasgow (albeit that there was a slight decline 
in 2018). By contrast, Prestwick has seen a continuous decline in this market.  One of the most 
dramatic changes has been the growth in non-EU traffic at Edinburgh, eclipsing Glasgow in 
2016 as the gateway of choice for this market segment. Prestwick has now lost all its non-EU 
traffic (Figure 9 and 10).    
Figure 9: EU terminal passengers at Edinburgh, 




















































Figure 10: Non-EU terminal passengers at 
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Prestwick 









Source: CAA airport statistics 2006-2018 
4.4 Route development 
Figure 11 which shows the number of routes served by the three airports between 2006 and 
2018 broadly mirrors growth trends also observed with regard to passenger traffic. Edinburgh 
has overtaken Glasgow in terms of the total number of routes. In 2018 it served 144 compared 
with 115 at Glasgow.  
Figure 11: Total routes at Edinburgh, Glasgow and 









Source: Flight Global OAG Analyzer 
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The number of routes at Prestwick has declined from 30 in 2006 to only 11 in 2018. However, 
it is important to note that this only covers scheduled traffic but not charter flights. At 
Edinburgh, the charter market is insignificant as in 2006, 96% of traffic was carried on 
scheduled services, this had increased to 98% by 2017. In contrast, charter operations have 
always accounted for a higher proportion of traffic at Glasgow (9% in 2017) - although there 
has been a marked decline in this market segment’s share of traffic from a level of 22% in 
2006.  The demise of charter operations is a phenomenon common to many other markets 
where there has been a significant loss of market share to LCCs.  
Growth in the number of routes served is not necessarily a reflection of the effects of increased 
competition. One approach is to calculate ‘route churn’, i.e. the number of air carrier route 
entry and exists at each airport for a given year. Figure 12 shows that there was a considerable 
level of route churn at the three airports between 2006 and 2018, suggesting competitive 
pressures, but there is no overall apparent trend that could indicate whether these pressures 
had increased or decreased over the years. Edinburgh airport was primarily responsible for 
the notably high levels of new routes in 2007 and 2017, whereas Prestwick experienced more 
losses of routes than the other airports in 2010 and 2015 when route closures were the most 
significant.   
Figure 12: Route Churn (entry and exit of routes) at 










Source: Flight Global OAG Analyzer 
Thirty-two routes were served by both Glasgow and Edinburgh in 2006. By 2018 an additional 
24 routes were shared by both airports.  Increased duplication of destinations by the two 
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airports could arguably be interpreted as a reflection of heightened competitive intensity.  
Interestingly in 2006, Prestwick and Glasgow shared six routes and by 2018 this has increased 
to eight.  
Both Edinburgh and Glasgow have respective entries in the webpages of the marketing website 
‘The Route Shop’ which lists potential new routes that each airport aspires to develop.  Given 
that Prestwick has lost many routes in recent years, it is not surprising that it identifies the 
largest number of routes (22) that could be served. Most of these are within Europe or Turkey 
but included on the list is also Boston and Orlando, demonstrating an ambition to once again 
serve the transatlantic market. Glasgow lists 10 routes, three of which are links to destinations 
in China. Similarly, amongst the 19 target routes identified by Edinburgh, three are in China 
with a further five proposals to link with airports located in other East Asian states. Overall, 
only three of the routes are in Europe, indicating an ambition to expand further in the non-
EU market segment. Several target routes have been listed by more than one Scottish airport 
(Boston, Brussels, Copenhagen, Hong Kong, Istanbul, Madrid, Orlando, Shanghai and 
Stockholm), suggesting the ability of these airports to potentially compete for services to these 
destinations.  
Table 4: Routes unserved shown on ‘The Route Shop’ 
Edinburgh airport (*) Glasgow airport Prestwick airport 
19 routes 10 routes 22 routes 
Bangkok, Bergen, Boston, 
Bremen, Bridgetown, 
Bucharest, Delhi, Guangzhou, 
Hannover, Hong Kong, Las 
Vegas, Los Angeles, 
Luxembourg, Moscow, Mumbai, 
Orlando, San Francisco, 
Shanghai, Tokyo.  
Beijing, Boston, Brussels, 
Copenhagen, Hamburg, Hong 
Kong, Istanbul, Madrid, 
Shanghai, Stockholm. 
Belfast, Boston, Brussels, 
Copenhagen, Cork, Dalaman, 
Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Geneva, 
Gothenburg, Istanbul, Lisbon, 
London, Madrid, Munich, 
Orlando, Oslo Paris, Prague, 
Southampton, Stockholm, 
Zurich. 
 (*) Edinburgh airport also identifies two underserved routes, Vienna and Zurich 
Source: The Route Shop (2019) 
4.5 Catchment area traffic 
The three airports attract passengers from many regions in Scotland, the majority originating 
from the Lowlands. Edinburgh airport arguably enjoys some accessibility advantages over its 
rivals.   Being located to the west of the City Centre, makes it closer and more accessible to 
21 
 
markets to the West of the lowlands such as Glasgow and its metropolitan region (see Figure 
1). In contrast, Glasgow airport is located to the west of Glasgow City Centre making it less 
accessible to residents of Edinburgh and East-Central Scotland. 
Catchment area statistics have been obtained for the time period under consideration (2009 
and 2013) but only for Edinburgh and Glasgow. The top ten regions that generated the most 
traffic in 2013 were the City of Edinburgh, Glasgow City, Fife, South Lanarkshire, West 
Lothian, Renfrewshire, North Lanarkshire, Perth and Kinross, Stirling and Dundee City.  
Edinburgh’s market share for all these regions increased between 2009 and 2013 (with the 
exception of West Lothian) tentatively suggesting that one of the reasons for Edinburgh’s 
superior growth performance in recent years has been its ability to attract residents that 
traditionally preferred to fly from Glasgow (Table 5). 
Table 5: Top ten regions served by Edinburgh/Glasgow 2013 and 








Source: CAA passenger survey report 2009 and 2013 (the 2018 report does not contain this data) 
5. Discussion  
Undoubtedly there have been some interesting developments in relation to the aeronautical 
charging strategies that have been adopted by the three Scottish airports. To some extent, 
these strategies relate to common ownership under BAA and the subsequent divestiture of 
Edinburgh airport. Common ownership ensured that there was consistency and uniformity in 
the published charges levied by both Edinburgh and Glasgow.  During the period 2006-2012 
BAA ensured that year-on-year real terms reductions in charge levels were achieved.  This may 
not have been entirely commercially-driven in the sense that BAA appeared to be deliberately 
lowering the risk of regulatory price control intervention through imposing on itself a 
Scheduled passenger 














Share  (%) 
2013 
City of Edinburgh 4,761 120 4881 95 98 
Glasgow City 362 2,153 2515 7 14 
Fife 963 70 1033 89 93 
South Lanarkshire 126 493 619 18 20 
West Lothian 446 65 511 91 87 
Renfrewshire 31 461 492 2 6 
North Lanarkshire 121 333 454 23 27 
Perth and Kinross 360 71 431 77 84 
Stirling 253 111 364 63 70 
Dundee City 276 71 347 73 80 
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voluntary price-cap of RPI-3% on average aeronautical yield (Competition Commission, 
2009).  
Following the sale of Edinburgh airport, charging strategies did change indicating the 
presence of stronger competitive forces.  Published charges increased at both Edinburgh and 
Glasgow, which seems counter-intuitive as in a more competitive environment one would have 
expected them to be lower.  However, charges at Edinburgh (particularly those that were 
passenger-related) rose more rapidly than at Glasgow. This may well reflect the airport’s 
intention, once separated from common ownership, to seize the opportunity to re-set its 
pricing strategy with reference to underlying market conditions where lower price-sensitivity 
(see the discussion below) limits the risk of losing market share to Glasgow. Meanwhile at 
Glasgow airport published charges also increased but not at the same rate as Edinburgh. This 
could indicate that as Prestwick’s business prospects had deteriorated post-2008, diminishing 
its competitive threat, Glasgow seized an opportunity to its raise aeronautical charges. Another 
interpretation of this is simply that charges increased after 2012 as both airports were no 
longer bound by the voluntary price-cap. If accepted, this argument gives credibility to the 
airline industry’s argument that economic regulation of airports is justified and needed (IATA, 
2013) in contrast to ACI-Europe’s opinion that is not necessary (ACI-Europe, 2017).  
Analysis of aeronautical yield provides further insight into pricing strategy.  While published 
charges were rising at Glasgow, yield had declined, which perhaps reflects the impact of 
discounting effects where, unlike at Edinburgh, there are weaker more price-elastic market 
conditions. Unfortunately, a knowledge gap exists with regard to Prestwick airport as it not 
possible to assess to the fullest extent its aeronautical charging strategy due to the existence of 
a negotiated contract with its main customer Ryanair and the different mix of traffic in any 
yield calculation.  Nevertheless, the limited evidence available does suggest that charges at 
Prestwick were and still are the lowest of all the three airports which is what would be expected 
given weaker business prospects relative to its larger competitors.    
In terms of service quality, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions, due again to the limited 
evidence that is available.  Generally, satisfaction rates improved during the period, which 
could well reflect a more competitive environment with airports seeking to enhance service 
levels in order to attract more airlines and passengers. One important aspect of measuring 
service quality is that there may be a lag-effect in any analysis since passenger satisfaction 
rates may decline during phases of construction and refurbishment in advance of new facilities 
becoming operational.  Indeed ICF (2016) noted that at Edinburgh there was a decline in 
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passenger satisfaction rates in both 2013 and 2014 due to short-term effects of capital 
investment on service delivery.   
With regards to traffic development, whilst there is a considerable overlap in the catchment 
areas served by the airports, Edinburgh in particular serves a very different core market 
compared to Glasgow and Prestwick. In addition to functioning as the administrative and 
political capital of Scotland, Edinburgh is also a significant centre for banking and finance, 
and possesses several internationally recognised and popular tourist attractions. In 2013 (the 
last year data is available), 31% of its passenger market was business-related, which 
represented the highest share of any UK airport with the exception of London City (56%) and 
Aberdeen (61%).  Forty per cent of its international leisure traffic was inbound which again 
was unusually high for a UK regional airport (CAA, 2014).  
By contrast, in terms of air travel propensity, Glasgow airport has a weaker catchment area, 
with the region having traditionally depended on heavy industries and the manufacturing 
sector for much of its wealth. With the decline of many of these industries, there have been 
ensuing economic consequences for the region in the form of higher than average 
unemployment and lower than average disposable income.  Glasgow is, therefore, more 
dependent than Edinburgh on the leisure market and LCC operation. In 2013, outbound 
leisure travel represented 77% of its traffic.  In 2009, Prestwick had the lowest share of 
business traffic (8%) with a more proportionally significant inbound leisure travel dependency 
than Glasgow, representing half its outbound figure (CAA 2010, 2014). Prior to the 2008 
financial crisis, the main carrier Ryanair was, in effect, the sole operator at Prestwick offering 
connections to a range of destinations including secondary airports located in key European 
metropolitan areas and airports serving traditional short-haul Mediterranean holiday resorts. 
Ryanair’s retrenchment at Prestwick, which was part of a wider network strategy to migrate 
operations to primary airports, led to the loss of several connections in 2018 leaving a very 
limited range of seasonal services to holiday destinations.  
Under common ownership, it has been claimed that BAA managed both airports as 
differentiated products offering Edinburgh as a business-focussed airport while Glasgow was 
presented as a predominantly leisure market facility. As such, little effort was made to develop 
any form of competitive rivalry between the two (CMA, 2016). By contrast, Prestwick and 
Glasgow have always been considered much more as direct competitors in recent years, largely 
due to Ryanair’s expansion of its Prestwick base which it opened in 1997.  Passenger volumes 
at Prestwick peaked at above two million passengers between 2005 and 2008. Although 
Prestwick is disadvantaged in terms of its distance from key population concentrations, this 
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was to some extent offset by the availability of a direct rail connection; its smaller size and 
lower airport costs’ these being important features which initially attracted Ryanair to serving 
the airport (Pagliari, 2005). 
The traffic analysis from 2006 shows that overall passenger numbers were affected by the 
economic recession of 2008-2009, but the impact was less pronounced at Edinburgh 
compared to Glasgow. This could well be due to Edinburgh’s lesser dependence on the 
outbound leisure passenger segment. There was also a terrorist attack at Glasgow airport in 
2007 which might have temporarily dampened traffic flows.  Consequently, after this period 
the overall traffic levels at both Edinburgh and Glasgow have increased significantly, 
tentatively suggesting a strengthening of the competitive forces between them.  
Meanwhile Prestwick’s traffic has followed a virtually continuous downward trend in recent 
years with no domestic services and just a small number of EU connections remaining. 
Significantly in 2014, Ryanair opened a Glasgow base with the launch of seven routes, in line 
with its practice elsewhere of moving into larger airports. This followed other airlines, such as 
Wizz, who shifted services from Prestwick in 2013. With less than 3% overall market share and 
only around 10 routes left, Prestwick’s ability to compete with the other airports appears to 
have weakened considerably.  
Pricing trends observed at Edinburgh and Glasgow suggests that the airports have recognised 
the significant differences in price elasticities that exist in their respective markets. It appears 
that the sizeable charge increases at Edinburgh have had no evident impact on the robust and 
sustained traffic growth than has been observed there since 2012, suggesting that the airlines 
are willing to pay higher charges for the market advantages that Edinburgh offers, rather than 
using the demonstrably cheaper Glasgow airport. Interestingly, in February 2018 Ryanair 
announced that it was transferring most of its Glasgow services to the more expensive 
Edinburgh airport for winter 2019 (although no information is available concerning the deal 
that has been agreed), while still maintaining limited operations from Glasgow (and 
Prestwick). The main reason for this shift the airline claimed was the high cost of the air 
passenger duty tax, although this still has to be paid on routes flying from Edinburgh 
(anna.aero, 2017). This means that it joined other LCCs such as Norwegian, Germanwings, 
Transavia and Vueling who decided to use Edinburgh as their preferred airport. This loss of 
routes for part of the year may partly explain the slight drop in Glasgow traffic in 2018.  
However, Ryanair announced in November 2018 that it would be re-instating in 2019 four 
of the 20 routes out of Glasgow Airport which it had cut - adding to the three routes remaining. 
This clearly demonstrates the fluid competitive situation that exists between the two airports.  
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The migration to Edinburgh is a reflection of the fact that many airlines, because of the nature 
of the market and the characteristics of the core catchment appear to be able to generate higher 
air fare yields by operating air services there compared to Glasgow.  
The increase in non-EU passengers and long-haul routes at Edinburgh could be interpreted as 
Edinburgh becoming more competitive in markets not previously considered by the airport 
during common ownership, where its business proposition was centred around functioning as 
a short-haul business-travel airport. New ownership has offered opportunities to develop a 
more diverse network serving both leisure and business markets. It had just one long-haul 
route in 2006. This compares to 2019, where the airport is connected to several long-haul 
destinations.  For example, the new routes opened in 2018 included: Beijing, Dubai, Chicago 
and Philadelphia. However, this long-haul centred strategy has not been welcomed by all its 
airline customers, as the airport has been criticised by two of its short-haul regional carrier 
customers, Flybe and Loganair for being too focused on long-haul operations at the expense 
of domestic flights operated by smaller aircraft (Dalton, 2018).   
6. Conclusions 
In summary, it was the aim of this paper to undertake an assessment of airport competition 
within the Scottish Lowlands region and to examine whether competitive forces have been 
strengthening or weakening in recent years. Overall the analysis shows that since ownership 
separation, competition has intensified between Edinburgh and Glasgow, whilst Prestwick 
airport, which benefitted from Ryanair expansion in the 1990s, is now a significantly 
diminished competitive proposition in the Scottish Lowland market.  
It is clear that at the beginning of the time period under consideration competition between 
Prestwick and Glasgow airport appeared quite strong, but the competitive forces between 
Glasgow and Edinburgh had been hindered by common ownership, albeit that there was still 
a considerable amount of route development and route churn taking place. However, it now 
appears that competition offered by Prestwick is quite minimal with the airport holding a very 
small market share. By contrast the competitive forces between Glasgow and Edinburgh seem 
to have been significantly strengthened, which is illustrated by not only a change in charging 
strategies but also by evidence suggesting that the airports are now seeking to appeal to the 
same markets rather than different segments, there are more shared routes, and some traffic 
from certain catchment areas seems to have shifted. Service quality at the two airports also 
appears to be improving.   These findings may have implications for the development of 
regulatory policy.  More specifically how competitive airport markets function and the 
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potential impact of ownership change on commercial behaviour and pricing strategy. 
Ownership change appears to have led to price divergence rather than lower charges which is 
in contrast to the expectations of policy makers when the Competition Commission concluded 
its examination of market power in the UK airport sector. 
Limitations within this analysis need to be recognised. The datasets, particularly related to 
areas such as service quality, passenger characteristics and catchment areas, are incomplete 
or somewhat dated, and overall the time horizon under consideration is relatively short. As a 
result, it has not been possible to undertake a more developed econometric approach to 
quantitatively assess the existence of competition. Moreover, greater insight could have been 
gained with primary research, as well as this secondary analysis, by consulting with some of 
the key stakeholders involved, particularly the airport operators and airlines, in order to 
incorporate their interpretation of some of the evidence gathered here. In fact, a series of semi-
structured interviews, with stakeholders involved – including passengers – would add to the 
knowledge base here and also greater understanding of the situation at Prestwick would also 
be very useful.   
An area where no conclusions can be drawn at present is the impact of the change of ownership 
of Glasgow from HAH to AGS, especially as this is a relatively recent development. Hence 
whilst this research has made a considerable and unique contribution to understanding the 
competitive forces between airports within the Scottish Lowlands region, there is certainly an 
opportunity for further research in the future. 
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